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SPECIAL INTERROGATION OF GESADDITR GLASFELD ALTMERG AND MANDL

1. CAREER

ALTMERG saw no point in his repeating his biography for the third time. As for recent activities, he stated he was given special tasks for the Ausserortiges Amt in Bulgaria after his retirement from Greece in November 1943; he was sick for six weeks from the end of July 1944, and at home in Beilingen; then he went to Vienna, where he remained almost till the Russians entered; 1-2 April he moved to Alt-Aussee, and then tried at the end of April to go to Fuchsle. He speaks with satisfaction of being picked up by the Americans, who "intelligerweise" did not tell him he was being arrested, and of the fact that the members of his Dienststelle -- KOTHE, ROTHE, THOM, HABEL, SCHAUS, and SCHULZ, who were picked up with him, have all, except ROTHE, apparently been released.

2. DIENSTSTELLE ALTMERG

KOTHE was ALTMERG's representative (deputy) there. The Dienststelle was organized 5-5 just after Italy. It took care primarily (!) of finding quarters for and feeding the members of the exile governments, first in Vienna, then, in the course of the winter, for members of them who went to Kitzbuehl and Semmering, and finally in February to Alt-Aussee.

The Dienststelle stayed in Vienna officially till 1-2 April, though most of the people had gone. In addition to the dreary activities mentioned above it of course got some information from new arrivals from the Balkans; numerous instructions came over during the winter, and very few publications.

3. THE GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE

Each of the two governments -- Romanian and Bulgarian -- had six to eight members; perhaps 100-150 helpers-on came from each country, and went to Kitzbuehl or Alt-Aussee.

ALTMERG says that the Protokollstelle of the Ausserortiges Amt helped in quartering the people. KOTHE was also at Aussee.

The Bulgarian Government made some difficulties before letting their people, and to take care of public order. There were plans to operate military units against the Soviets, but nothing came of it because of lack of ready-made officers here to be in the Waffen SS, who were trained (at least the commanders) at Doellersheim. Listuf. STIER was liaison officer for the Waffen SS to the Bulgars and Romanians in this matter. (00012)

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289

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The governments had the political task of getting together their nationals in the Reich, and doing job of listening to Soviet broadcasts from Bucharest or Sofia and monitoring them.

4. DIENSTSTELLE ALT-EUSSE -- INFORMATION AND COORDINATIONS

The Dienststelle supplied the government with its information, received from the press, prisoners, and persons crossing from the Balkans; and also from SD reports, which were given to the Dienststelle through LEISCHKA, though not in their entirety. This SD information was given quite informally. It was intended that LEISCHKA would be the liaison man between SD and Dienststelle at Alt-Aussee.

The Dienststelle had 16 people at Vienna, including secretaries and messengers; about ten were still together at Aussee.

There was little activity there, but a J/T net was established, which had poor connections with Berlin, and passed up reports from the various press services -- it was, etc. -- they also had a sender which they destroyed after one or two weeks; they sent one message to Berlin, asking for money, but got no answer. Previously they had J/T contact from Vienna with Berlin.

5. AUSSWAERTIGES Amt AND DIENSTSTELLE

To the question whether KIYAN's assumption of power for the South had affected the Dienststelle, ALT-E. said indignantly that it had nothing to do with the Dienststelle; that there was no question of his acting independently of the Auswaertiges Amt at the end, but simply of his losing contact with it.

6. COMMITTEE ON ALTEBORG

This person is thoroughly disapprovable and untrustworthy; his information, as evidenced in this report, is probably worthless; his main aim is to turn an interrogation into a lecture on the shortcomings of the Americans in their talkings with him, and on the evils of Russian occupation.

7. HEDL AND VTF - SPECIAL INTERROGATION

HEDL was with VTF from July 62 to the end of 63, making some intervening trips to Italy. VTF was still in a temporary strasse 6a. HEDL was working on training -- figure and a wall at Hohenbrinck near Berlin, which became a dormitory and a small J/T training school, and eventually was moved to Friedensstrasse.

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- 3 -

2. 9. SKORZENY VS. DOERNER

There was a dispute about leadership between SKORZENY and DOERNER, which ended with SCHILLINGER's backing SKORZENY and with DOERNER's being reduced to procuring material and taking care of technical matters.

MEDDL's own work was general training and sifting of personnel.

The school actually opened 3 October 43.

3. 9. MEDDL IN VI E

People disputed about what MEDDL's next job should be; finally he was ordered to Vienna by SCHILLINGER to work for VI E in setting up information sources in Austrian industries (?). Then he was given a special job at Agrom at the beginning of 1944, to find out where TITO was, and in general to get information on Communist circles. He was at Agrom till the beginning of December 1944.

For communications, he used a courier (frequently himself), teletype, or W/T.

SKORZENY was to indulge in an operation against TITO in May, and MEDDL was to prepare the plan, but nothing came of it.

The 2nd Panzer Army Corps tried an operation, with Brandenburg Division personnel, in June 44, but took most of the month.

4. 10. VI E-S

In December 44, MEDDL came to VI E, after the customary row about his job, since VI S wanted him, and was given a new Referat VI E-S, in which he was to collate information from the various Landesreferate on the feasibility of operations in the Southeast. He had contacts with the KG 100 (Edo. Milne), and was supposed to take care of technical preparations for operations.

There followed a discussion of various plans:

5. 11. OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA

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a) Operation with TMA.

With SCHILLINGER, who was in Vienna, an operation for northeast Albania was planned under Instuf. TMA, in Altimont, in the Skanderbeg Division, with a Kommando of 3-4 men, plus a W/T man supplied by MEDDL, a Norwegian named HANSEN, who had been

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- 4 -

trained at the school in Berlin. Arrangements were made with Kdo. Klara to drop the men at the beginning of March, but there were no planes, until the end of April, so nothing came of it.

Numerous Albanians had remained there, under agreement with SCHNEIDERVA to fight against the Bolsheviks (these were men of the Skanderbeg Division). Contact with them was lost.

TELA left Vienna with 3 of his men, went to Klagenfurt, and tried to get through to Croatia (ultimato goal Albania); HSINRICH left for Tyrol, possibly Schwaz.

TELA was supposed to meet people in the Skoplje-Ushueb-Mistrovica area, where ADJIF BIJUCA and DAKO were active. This whole group were Mohammedans: TELA was to contact them.

b) ALI DRAGA Operation

This man, son of a leading Mohammedan of Kosovo, PERAD BEG DRAGA, who had retired into the mountains, was to go to Albania, but nothing came of this. He is, I/T man, who speaks Albanian and Serbian, and is a Volkstaatlicher, was sent to Berlin and was to go with this operation.

c) SILSSI FARI Operation

This was also to go to Kosovo. Its lead was a youth leader from there, who had unfortunately enriched himself in politics, but anyway had a big following. He was in Vienna, to which he had come with Hgr. E. No I/T operator was ready for this operation, but two Albanians were being trained for it.

d) TOPTANI Operation

This was to go to the Scutari-Tirana area. Its leader, TOPTANI, had been with the Schutz, and worked with Hauptmann LANG. The operation was not sent because of inadequate preparation.

C. II. OPERATIONS IN SERBIA

a) MICHAELA (GASPAREVIC)

A Serb captain GASPAREVIC (cover name G. M. O. K.), plus SS Ustuf SOLINY and 50 Serbs, were to run this operation. They were equipped with I/Ps and I/Gs, 3 I/T nets, 5 operators, one a Serb (M. C. K) with cover name KIK. The group started from Sarajevo. A Cetnik Colonel BOBOT, commander of the Aust-Bosnia Cetniks, shipped them through. They were to meet GILOVIC's I/T nets - stations at Belgrade and wish and with his Commandos.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 5 -

Not many reports came from them; mostly they were military, discussing their fights with the partisans. The operation was run in mid-January, and the people are still there. They had 250 gold napoleons, and were well equipped with U/T.

b) DECARNVIC Operation

This one was planned but not run. DECARNVIC was chief of the Serb Special Police, in charge of the anti-Communist section, and so worked willingly with the Germans. 40 of his police agents, from various Serbian cities, were to go with him, but the plan was held up by a three-cornered scrap among MELILLOVIC, LJOTIC, and MEDIC, and DECARNVIC refused to wait for the end, and was sent to Istria. HANDEL told him to set up there an intelligence network to work against TITO. He is there now, with U/T and arms.

c) JANKO Operation

JANKO went alone to the Belgrade area to set up contact points, but he had no U/T set, and no information from him has come in since he went in January.

d) VUKOVIC Operation

He belongs to the LJOTIC strongly anti-Communist direction. His 30 Serbs and two U/T men were to go out in two groups and set up information reporting-points, but they stayed in Vienna till near the end, and then went west.

e) MASALJIC Operation (cover name: DILAND)

This man, a leading Mohammedan youth movement man from the Sandjak, was an old fighter with STOJANOVIC. He used to form points d'appui and arrange for slipping through persons to Montenegro, Albania, and to MELILLOVIC. He was in the police HQ. Vienna. He got as far as Sarajevo, and HANDEL received frequent U/T reports from him -- e.g. that he had sent 6 or 7 of his people through from Sarajevo. Then came the retreat, and he went to Ljigum, where he made an agreement with RADULIC to co-operate with MELILLOVIC, an old school pal of his at Sarajevo, in the struggle against Bolsheviks. RADULIC offered him the command over the East Bosnia Ustachist Army, which was Mohammedan, and ordered him to organize this area and to make contact with Albania. This was planned for this spring. RADULIC does not know that MASALJIC is working for the Germans.

With the last possible alarm, RADULIC managed to reach LJOTIC a Volksdeutschler from Serbia named RADULIC, a student friend of MASALJIC. No news has been received since it was learned that FRANZEWSKI had got through to the Sandjak and made contact with STOJAN, a HANDEL stay-behind man who was an Ustachist captain

SECRET

S E C R E T

- 6 -

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in Sarajevo, and was occupied in combatting partisans. PRIMONSKI was to set up contacts from the Croatian border.

f) KUNZEL Operation (MULSC)

This man was of German descent, came from near Salzburg; had studied there and at Berlin, was in the Yugoslav Army, lived in Agram, knows Yugoslavia excellently. MUDL got him to Vienna-austria. He was supposed to work with DR. VUKOLOVIC, a V-Land from Montenegro, and was supported by DR. JILOVIC, Montenegrin Primo Minister, at Agram. Dr. STADELIJA, DR. JILOVIC's secretary, is an expert on Montenegro. These people are in Croatia, with J/T outfit: their last reports were from Agram, about the beginning of May.

g) KURTUS Operation

This was an operation in Croatia, headed by Count LEIBER, an ex-Communist, half-Jewish, who had fought with the Reds in Spain (and had been a member of the Intelligence Service), then went to France, where he worked for the Austrian State Police under Dr. LEIBER; and he continued his intelligence work after the Anschluss. He is a very able man. Shortly after the Anschluss he went to Yugoslavia, where he was active from 1931 to 1944. He is acquainted with the heads of the Ustache, a. a. Col. LUBORIC, who had contact with KLAJNOV (with KLAJNOV might be exploited), and who had been ordered by K.N.D.C. to set up a resistance group; and Col. K. J. CO., who wanted an understanding with the Western powers; and Col. KOMELA, (chief of the Croatian Intelligence), who had to accompany the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, evidently because of a report that he had been negotiating with the Western Powers.

h) KLOPP (BINGO) Operation

(This is presumably the operation of that name discussed in Para 50 of the Annex to Report 3 1943 on KNOBL). It was a plan for an operation, via Agram, to place a liaison man with DR. DR. JILOVIC. The agent was from the United, had studied at the Welthandelschule in Vienna, and was married to a relative of KLAJNOV. The agent had one J/T operator, J/T equipment, and money. His last report was from Agram, a request to V.I.B. for the exact location of DR. JILOVIC (with whom V.I.B. was in contact still). MUDL thinks the operation may not have got through.

i) MUDL (cover name) Operation

Two Croats, one of them with the cover name MUDL, and a J/T operator (cover name M.G.D.), a Croat student, were to operate at Fiume, signalling to Agram, to get information about KNOBL. The operation was later changed to one of finding out about Communist activities in Istria. The men were in contact with KLAJNOV, whence messages were sent to Vienna by teletype.

S E C R E T

SECRET

- 7 -

j) NOTES ON THESE OPERATIONS

MANDL remarks that BESEKOV would not have approved of sending KONRAD (XLEBER) out; the operations in general were directed by HOETTL, who gave MANDL a special task re Yugoslavia early in 1944.

7. ~~b~~. OPERATIONS IN SLOVAKIA

Only recently (summer 1941) had Slovakia been transferred from Aus III to VI E. Contacts there were few. Later, efforts were made by the Jagdkommandos to work there; they had a "resistance line" in Eastern Slovakia, but they were short of I/T equipment, and MANDL supplied them with batteries, and they agreed to send intelligence reports for the VI E people there, as well as any political information picked up by themselves, to VI E direct. This agreement was made in February 1940. VI E had five agents in Slovakia who used this method.

The Jagdkommandos had orders to stay behind in Slovakia, and may still be there. Their orders were extended to include also Moravia.

Dr. REINDEL was a collaborator of the Ardennen-Kommandeur there; MANDL does not remember the name of the Kommandeur. The Jagdeinsatz numbered 50-60 men, and had an agreement with the HUENK Guard, by which some hundreds of Italian people were to be added to them. All these people were under Jagdkommando Sudost, center in Vienna.

8. ~~c~~. ORGANIZATION OF THE JAGDKOMMANDOS

MANDL emphasises the military nature of this organization, with SCHREIBER as chief, BESEKOV his Chief of Staff, and Lt. Ib, i.e. officers under them. The various Jagdkommandos cooperated with the corresponding Gruppen of Aus VI: their Jagdkommando Sudwest with SICILLS of VI A; Jagdkommando Nordwest with PFERD-GM of VI D, Jagdkommando Ost with HAT of VI B; Jagdkommando Sudost with VI E, and also with the "heavy armor" of VI C.

MANDL was liaison man between VI E, VI C, and Jagdkommando Sudost from the beginning of December 1944. He does not feel that the coordination worked well, primarily because of SCHREIBER's essentially military interest in the operations.

9. ~~d~~. ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING OF JAGDKOMMANDOS

In August or September 1944 SCHREIBER received Hitler's orders to set up resistance movements and stay-behind groups in occupied (or liberated) Europe.

SECRET

S E C R E T

- 8 -

SKORZENY was supposed to collaborate in political matters with VI.

For the Southeast, SKORZENY set up Jagdeinsätze for Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia-Serbia, (combined), Albania, Bulgaria, Austria, and Turkey. There was none for Greece. MINDL cannot give exact figures on these; he estimates that they averaged a few hundred men each, but he points out that it is hard to say, e.g. whether a group of Ustacha operating with the Jagdverbände were actually part of a Jagdeinsatz or not.

Men in the Jagdeinsätze were trained primarily in areas, sabotage, guerilla warfare etc.; there was practically no political training.

10. TRAINING FOR THE PIRELLA-BITTER OPERATION (SARAJEVO)

Reichsführer HELLERSTEIN, one of MINDL's men, was teacher of the evacuation quarters in an old Labor Service Camp on the Kausiedlungssee (exact location forgotten), where training for this operation was given from mid-November 1944 to the end of January. HELLERSTEIN supervised the school; the people being trained in it had been with him at an SS school in the Reich.

11. GIZEL
11. JAIHDHOF & H/T OF JAGDEINSÄTZE IN BULGARIA

This is located about 20 km. north of Arad, on the Danube, from the end of October 1944, when the Jagdkommandos were formed (from specialists formerly with the Brandenburg Division, most of whom voluntarily joined the Jagdkommandos and with them the SS), until about 1 April 1945, when the staff moved to Admont.

Most of the H/T operators for Jagdeinsätze Südost were trained at Jaihdhof -- c. 20-30 men, under a signals officer.

MINDL says that training in weapons was given by each Jagdeinsatz by itself, not through a central school.

12. ALBANIEN OPERATION UNDER JUSSOSS

The Jagdeinsatz Albanien, which had been located at Vienna, was ordered by Ostwurf BENESCH at the last minute to march via Croatia to Albania, with JUSSOSS conducting them. There were about 20 men, who, MINDL thinks, have gone into the mountains, but probably did not get far on their way. He had to provide a H/T operator for them at the last moment.

13. FURTHER RE-TRAINING OF JAGDEINSÄTZE

There was a training school for Bulgarians at Nikolsdorf on the Kausiedlungssee, which was moved to a place (name unknown) northwest of Vienna.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

- 9 -

MENDL insists that there was no political training, and that even the leaders of the Jagdverbände had little or not any political qualification; he points to MÜLLER of the Jagdeinsatz Albanien as an example -- a man from Hamburg who knew little about the Balkans. MENDL was supposed to supply the political coordination for operations, but the people he dealt with were military people, little concerned with politics.

Only in Slovakia, where Dr. PAVLOVSKY and MINDL were active, and in Rumania, did the Jagdverbände show much political sense.

14. 26. JAGDVERBÄNDE AS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

MENDL was much interested in procuring for VI B intelligence from the Jagdverbände, but had little luck. He did make a deal once to get information from Croatia, and there was some success with Slovakia. HAGELICIC had contact with a man whom MINDL had planted for VI B in a Jagdkommando, and thus some information was procured.

15. 27. SKORZENY AND BESSÖH

MINDL recalls that SKORZENY came twice to the Jädlhof, and spoke with BESSÖH. Normally BESSÖH, who was directly under SKORZENY, would go to Berlin to report to him. BESSÖH had been a Major of the Luftwaffe, and had an assimilated rank of Oberstleutnant in the SS. He moved with the staff to Aachen at the beginning of April.

16. 28. RESISTANCE PLANS

MINDL claims that the plans for resistance by the Jagdverbände were connected with military expectations in the Balkans, where e.g., HIMMLER prophesied in mid-November that by mid-January they would again be in Belgrade (he kept repeating the prophecy, with variations in the date).

In the event that Germany won the war, MINDL hypothesizes that the Jagdverbände, especially Jagdkommando Hitler, would have been used for a "Grossreinigung" -- a general clean-up within Germany, where he expected that the returning front fighters would have been in a mood to settle accounts with the NSDAP home front boys. In that case, the Jagdverbände would have become a palace guard for the Party. In Jagdkommando Hitler, he points out, the members are mainly young soldiers, of the SKORZENY desperado type, without political drive.

He says that after 20 July 1944, the Jagdkommando Hitler at Berlin went out under SKORZENY on a clean-up job, which he said (or implied) was that of an Umlegokommando.

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

-10-

17. ~~25.~~ JAGDVERBAND PLANS IN AUSTRIA

MENDL says he never discussed with SKORZECKY his role in the Werewolf, but assumes he had some special position in it.

Jagdkommando Sudost was to stay behind in Upper and Lower Austria and form a resistance nucleus (which might be a Werewolf one) against the Russians. He does not know how many members actually remained behind, but he knows that SCHNECH and his whole group had orders to stay there and be overrun.

MENDL heard from STEINERT (under a pseud.) at Admont that they intended to stay in the occupied zone, and that WIECH was hunting for points d'appui there. MENDL is sure that some caches at least are there. He insists that there were no similar arrangements for the other parts of Austria not occupied by Russians. He does not know Drif GIEBEL, and he knows of no Werewolf representatives (unless SKORZECKY could be so regarded) who came to Jagdkommando Sudost.

18. ~~25.~~ BESSEKOW: VI S 2 and VI S 4

These were the referate that trained small-scale operations. VI S 2 had originally been under RADL, but was transferred to BESEKOW when RADL became SKORZECKY's adjutant. BESEKOW already headed VI S 4.

Such training was developed prior to the invasion of Western Europe, and in particular from October 1943, after the return of SKORZECKY from Italy and thefeat of reuniting himself. The maximum size of the groups would be 10-20 men, and usually they would include not more than a couple of men.

19. ~~25.~~ ASSASSINATION PLANS

BESEKOW had left behind him a small organization of this type in France, the name of which MENDL does not know, and this group tried to assassinate DE GAULLE.

About a year ago, BESEKOW planned an operation to assassinate STALIN; this was to start from Berlin, and had some connection with a Russian courier pilot -- obviously working for the Germans -- who arrived about that time with a lot of documents. MENDL claims not to know details, or whether the operation actually was tried.

MENDL added that his chief activity in 1944 was to prepare a similar operation against TITO (no details of it are forthcoming, but the interrogator doubts that this was all that was involved). He says that individual agents were dropped to prepare for this operation, and that some had not been heard from.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 11 -

VI S 2 originally controlled all operations for VI S, before the Jagdverbände were formed; then it was reduced to handling small-scale operations. VI S 4 had originally the task of preparing a stay-behind network in the expectation of invasion.

20. 25. SCHLEIBERG

SCHLEIBERG, according to MIDL, was very much opposed to SKORZENY, who in his unorthodox way used to bypass SCHLEIBERG and go to KALTHERMANN directly (as he bypassed KALTHERMANN for NIEMEIER, and NIEMEIER for HITLER!)

MIDL knew well a student-friend of JOSEPH LANGE, and has known SCHLEIBERG personally since he came to the SA (after starting a legal career as Regierungsassessor). SCHLEIBERG was about 26 at the time, had rank of Oberst, but shortly was running skilfully a Zentralabteilung in Amt I, including espionage, and generally showing his outstanding ability. Unfortunately, he fell on him, he went to HEDDICH's adjutantur, continued to enjoy the favor of the CdS, and then became Gruppenleiter IV B, where he ran counter-espionage within Germany.

He was transferred to Amt VI, and, after HEDDICH's dismissal, appeared as Acting Head of Amt VI (signing as "VI V" ... i.e. V Vertreter). After HEDDICH's death, he remained in office to report every two weeks or so to HITLER, where he won the favor, and eventually under KALTHERMANN he was confirmed as Head of Amt VI.

SCHLEIBERG, like HEDDICH, is a master at getting off possible rivals, a "teile und herrsche" man, who would never let anyone else grow too strong.

21. 27. VI F: MICROFILM

Microfilming was in charge of Oberst. "Bloody" VOIGT, an expert photographer, who was at the evacuation quartering of VI F in Marienbad, and who MIDL thinks went south.

Description of VOIGT: age 35/36; 1.75 meters, ponytail, blue-gray eyes, regular features, medium build, a "schneider Mann"; Saxon, with strong Saxon accent.

The Referent of VI F 4, Staf. REINHOLD, expert on passport forgeries and money forgery, could also know about this. MIDL mentioned in passing a forgery operation called Unternehmen

S E C R E T

SECRET

- 12 -

BERNHARD (the matter was not further discussed). RUGGER stayed in Berlin, then moved to evacuation quarters in Thuringia. RUDOLPH claims not to know details of the microfilming, but says in any case it was done only for Amt VI by VI F. He mentioned the good technical setup of the Kriminaltechnischen Institut, and says that in a dispute re competence between this and VI F, RUDOLPH-BRUNNER decided not only to maintain VI F but to expand it.

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